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A STUDY OP TORT LIABILIT'l FC�

NEGLIGENCE APPLIED TO GUIDANCE
AND STUDENT PERSONNEL WORKERS

PREFACI

Just a rapid glance at the number ot law schools and
law librarie s , the work of our state and federal legisla
tures, the lengthy listings in the telephone directories
of any large city

under the heading "Lawyers ,"

and the

backlog or cases pending hearing on the court docke t s
demonstrates that ours i s a legally oriented society.

In

spite of all thia, the area or legal responsibility or
school guidance and student personnel workers is an area
that until recent years has been given ve17 little con
s ideration by school personnel.
uncertain,

It 1a an area that is

continually vacillating, and one that has very

little legal precedent.
'l'he legal aspects of counseling and personnel services
cover a wide field which includes confidentiality,
keeping, diaaeminat ing student information,
slander,

record

libel and

search ot student rooma, accessory before the

fact, acceaaory after the fact,

and negligence.

Because

of the extent of each of theae topics it will be necessary
to delimit this study to tort liability of school employee s ,
especially guidance and student personnel workers, tor
negligence.
It ia the purpose of this report to establish guidance
and student personnel work aa a profession,

-iii-

to survey the

history and structure of negligence and tort liability
for negligence as used in the courts of law, to show
the effect of negligence and liability on other profe ssions medicine,

law,

theology,

accounting - and to parallel this

to the counseling profession.

The writer is aware that

this does not represent any existing law and is certainly not
attempting to provide the legal defense for a hypothetical
or test case, for only a properly cert ified attorne1 can do
this.

Rather this is an endeavor to explore in length an

area that 1a of interest to the writer and should be of
interest to all guidance and student personnel worke rs,

as

well as other school employees, making them aware of the
fact that some of their actions may have legal repercussions .
It is also an attempt to promote concern over the leaa l
problems of the profession,

thus cultivating a better

understanding of the legal implications of counseling.
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CHAPTER I
INTBODUCTION

•Historically,

the term guidance hes been used in

the field or education to designate the a s s istance given
to students in the solution or problems that lay outside
1
the area or classroom teaching a1tuat 1ona."

For the

purpose of this paper guidance workers can beat be defined
as those proteaaionally trained individuals engaged in
the field or education whoa• a id is enlisted by others to
help them to understand themaelvea,

to adJuat to their

environment , and to make their own dec1a1ona.

This �roup

includea members ot counseling centers and special clinics ,
such a a , reading,

speech and hearing, and study skills.

student personnel workers are those involved on the high
school or college level in special student services out
s ide the academic field, more apec1t1call7, housing and
rood aervioea,

atudent activities , health aervicea,

student d1ac1pl1ne.

Also included among this group

and
are

those engaged in auch areas of student services aa student
records,

adm1aaione,

financial a ide and placement.

Anthony J. Humphreys and Arthur R. Traxler, Guidance
Servicea, Chicago:
Science Research Associates, Inc. ,
1954 , p. 74 .
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Guidance and student peraonnel work are relatively
new profeaaions since Frank l.�rsona 1n 1908 organ1Zed the
"It is said that this waa

Vocational Bureau of Boston.

the first time on record that the terms • vocational
guidance' and •vocational counselor' were used ." 2 Since
that time the areas of guidance and student personnel
work have grown immensely.

The 1966 American Personnel

and Guidance Aeaociat1on convention was the largest con
3 Currently
vention ever to be held in Washington, D.c.
the membership of the APOA is approximately

30,000 guid-

ande and student personnel workers.
Guidance and student personnel services have become
a new profeaaion; and that it 1a a profeaeion cannot be
denied.
Pormerly theology. law. and medicine
were specifically known as ' the pro
teaaiona • ; but aa the applications
of science and learning are extended
to other departments ot affairs.
other vocations also receive the
name. The work 1ntpl1ea proteaaed
attainments in apeo1al knowledge
aa distinguished from mere skill. 4
'l'he same court also said that a profeaaional ia one en
gaged 1n mental work which ia varied 1n character rather
than routine and requires knowledge or an advanced type

2

Ibid •• p .

6.

3
The Ouide oat, Washington: American Personnel and
Guidance Xaaocla Ion, VIII. No. 6 (June, 1966 ) , 5.

4

�

Aulen v . Triumph Explosive, 58
-2-

F.

SUpp . 8 (1944).

which is acquired by prolonged intellectual study.

The

professional is also require<; to exercue discretion and
Judgment in his work, and the work output is one that
cannot be standard1Zed in relation to a given period of
time.5

Profession has also been defined by the courts as

a " vocation, calling, occupation or employment involving
labor, skill, education, special knowledge and compensation
or profit, but the labor and skill involved is predominantly
mental or intellectual, rather than physical or menta1."6
Guidance and student personnel work can then be
ri�ttully called legitL�ate proteaaions and will be re
ferred to aa such since they encompass mental and intellec
tual skill, advanced educational requirements, specialized
knowledge , and compensation.

The personnel worker recognizes

his work as professional and has established professional
organizations with recognized codes of ethics.

Departments

of education have provided positions and opportunities for
counselors

1n

many states, the federal government has appro

priated tunda for training counselors and establishing
counseling centers, and states have set up license require
ments tor counselor certification.

Involvement

1n

legis

lative activities by the American Personnel and Guidance

6

Ibid., p. 8.

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Crazy Water Co., 16 0
(2d) 102 (1942).
3

-

-

s.

W.

Association serves also to 1dent11'y guidance and personnel
work as a profession:
The Association serves aa a major source
of information, research, and expert
opinion on guidance and personnel work
to the Congress ot the united States,
to federal, state, and local governme nts,
to independent agencies, to the general
public, and to 1ta members.
APGA presents its views 1n various ways.
Teetimony is given before Committees of
Congress upon re ueat. Porrnal letters or
information are ranamitted to the Con
gress upon invitation. When requested
to do ao, APGA stat? provides expert
conau!tation for Congressional Committee
Chairmen, Conunittee membera, and House
and Senate Conunittee 8*a!Ste. APQA
members, as profeaaional persons, fre
quently express their individual views
to Congresa.7

!

The profeaaional statua of guidance and student
personnel is established, yet it ia hindered insofar as
it does not enjoy some of the legal privileges granted
to other professions.

It doea not have the immunity of

privileged communication that 1• enjoyed by the legal,
medical, and theological profeaaiona either by statute,
constitution, or caae law, even though 1t is involved in
communications with others which by their verry nature must
remain privileged.

Interviews, records, and private dia

cuaaiona between the guidance or student personnel worker
and his client must be kept contidential in order that the

Carl McDaniela, " The Leg1alat1ve Position of the APOA,,"
Personnel and Guidance Journal, XLIII (April, 1965), p . 833.
-

4

-

counselor may effectively gain the confidence of his client
and successfully establish a meaningful relationship.

It

is not surprising than that concern should arise over the
legal responsibilities of the profession.
There has been much question among the members of
the

guidance and student personnel profession concerning

their legal rights and responsibilities 1n recent years.
This is evidenced by the number of a:a:·t1cles that have
been published in professional Journals, books, and papers
regarding the legal aspects and problems of the profession;
an� a number of conferences and speeches have embraced the
subj ect at meetings of professional organizations.

In 1 96 2

in Philadelphia, Martha Ware preeented a speech entitled
" Freedom to Refrain" to the Pennsylvania Asaoc1at1on of
Women Deana and Counselors in which she discussed the conf ident1al1ty of the counselor regarding student records.
As early as 1 954 Thomas M. Carter

1n

the November issue of

the Personnel and Guidance Journal expressed his concern
over the professional immunity and privileged communication
of the counselor.

11

Some Le gal Implications for Personnel

Officers" by Douglas Parker was published in the Journal of
the National Association ot Women Deana and Counselors warn
ing personnel workers of poaa1ble liability for some of
their actions; and Inez Livingston

1n

the Personnel and

Guidance Journal 1n January, 1965 , aaka the queation "Is
the Personnel Worke r Liable?"

Justin Snith spoke about

the confidentiality of records and student rights at the
-5-

American Personnel and Guidance Association convention
in Minneapolis in

1965,

and

Jeveral ses31ons of the

1970

convention in New Orleans were devoted to the legal
problems of the guidance and student personnel worker.
The guidance and student personnel worker should be
concerned about all the legal aspects of his profession.
but since this

is

a study of tort liability

attention will be focused on this facet.
little Judicial p rec eden t

guidance

so:mel worker. with few cases eve.,..

1n

these

of legal

and student per

o�ought

before the

and almost no legislation relating to people

areas has

statutes.

There is very

regarding the subject

liability tor negligence of the

courts of law;

for negligence

been

developed 1n federal or state

But this does not grant any protection from

liability to individuals engaged 1n the profession of
guidance and student personnel work when their actions are
alleged to be directly responsible for the inJuries incurred
by others.

Guidance and student personnel workers. teachers,

and other school employees, as well as doctors, lawyers.
and accountants are individually responsible for their own
acts.

If another is injured as a direct result of the neg

ligence of a guidance or student personnel worker, the 1nd1�
vidual guidance or student peraonnel worker may be held
liable if a cause of action can be shown to exist.
Having defined the areas of guidance and student
personnel work and having established these occupations as

-6-

profesa1ons with very little legal precedent.

the question

now arises of' the respons1b1.i1ty of the guidance and
student pe rsonnel worker for his negligent actions.

The

followin� chapters will explore the theory of tort liabi
lity for negligence as it began 1n common law.
today, and

how

it

as it is

is related to the areas of guidance and

student personnel work.

7

-

-

CHAPTER II
NEGLIGENCE

Tort as defined by Black, a noted authority in law,
is a private or civil wrong or injury 1ndepend•nt of
contract. a Thia is to say that a tort is a wrongful act
tor which a legal action may lie.

The person who commits

the to�tioua act (defendant) ia obliged under law (liable )
to the 1nJured party (plaintitf) .

Unlike a crime for which

the state will prosecute, the civil action for

•

tort ia

initiated by the 1nJured party.
"Until the middle of the eighteenth century, it (tort)
was

1n

common use in England and America aa a synonym for

•wrong•.

Gradually its uaage was restricted to the tecpn1cal

vocabulary of the lawyer.

It 1a now defined as any wrongful

act, other than a breach of contract, which may serve as the
basis tor a auit for damages. "9
A

tort committed aga1nat another person may be done

intentionally or it may be the result or negligence .

Those

torta which are willful or intentional include aaaault, bat
tery, talae 1mpr1aonment, defamation ot character, treapaaa

Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, St. Paul,
Minn. : West Publishing Company, 1951, p. 1660.
9
Thomas Edward Bl ackwell, College Law: A Guide for
Administrators, Washington: American Council on Bilucat1on,
1961, p. 9.
-8-

to land, treapaaa to chattels, invasion of the right of
privacy, release of information, fraud and conversion.
When a tort is willful or intentional the one who commits
the act (tortfeaaor) knows or 1a uaually certain that his
action will cauae injury to another.

Intentional torts,

however, are not the subject of this paper and will not
be discussed

1n

further detail.

Negligence, which is the main theme, may be defined
as aa act or omission which unreasonably does or may
affect the rights of others.

It 1a "the omission to do

something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary
conaideratione which ordinarily regulate human affairs,
would do, or the doing ot something which a reasonable and
prudent man would not do.1110

Negligence does not require

intent on the part or the actor.

It is auff icient that the

commission or omission occurred even through carelessness
or thoughtleaaneaa.

Negligence in itself does not consti

tute the tort, but negligence becomes a tort when a person
performs an act or neglects to perform an act that unreason
ably result• in the proximate cause of another's injury.
'!'he definition of negligence tells us that one can be
liable for an act �r tor the omission of an act that affects
the rights of others and results in harm.

Io

Black, op. c1t., p. 1184.
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"Intention as well

as action may be negligenoe."ll

It makes no difference

if the negligence is active or passive or if the injury
arose through the nonfeasenee, the malfeasance, or the
misfeasance of the wrongdoer.1 2

Nonteaaance is "the

omission to do something, especially what ought to have
been done;"l3 malfeasance is "the doing of an act which
a person ought not to do;"l4 and misfeasance is "the doing
wrongfullJ and injuriously of an act which one might do in
a la�;..ul manner." 15

The

court also says that either mis

feasance or nonteasance or a combination of both may be
considered negligence. 16

"Negligence is want of ordinary

care and may consist in doing something which ought not to
or in not doing aomething which ought to be done."17

be done,
Aa

guidance and student personnel workers and as indi

viduals we have a negative duty ot not doing willful harm

as well as a positive duty to avoid injury

11

to another.

we,

Public Service Co. of N. H. v. Elliott, 123 F {2d)
2 (1941
12
Gindele v. Corrigan, 22 M. 1. 516 (1889).
13
Webster's New Colle iate Dictionarz, Springfield, Mass. :
a. & c. Merriam company, 1 53, p. 571.
14
Ibid., p. 508.
15
Ibid., p. 538.
16
Dauris1o v. Merchant'• Dispatch Transportation Co.,
4
27 N. Y. S. 174 (1934).
17
Lepotaiq v. Chapman, 10 Ohio Law Rep. 560 (1911).
•

�

-10-

therefore, must be as concerned with doing nothing 1n a
situation that calls for action, as well aa with an overt
act which becomes the reason for another's suffering.
When to act or when to refrain from acting is often a
difficult decision.

The difference between misfeasance

and nonfeasance is obvious in theory, but in practice it
is not always eaay to say when conduct is active or paaaive.18
'!'here is no distinction made in early conunon law be
It came into 1ta

tween negligence and the other torta.

own in the nineteenth century and 1a beat summed up aa
follows:
"Negligence was acarecely recognized
as a separate tort before the earlier
part or the nineteenth century. Prior
to that time, the word had been used in
a very general sense to describe the
breach or any legal obligation, or to
designate a mental element, usually one
of inadvertence or indifference, enter
ing into the comm1aa1on of other torts.
Some writers once maintained that negli
gence is merely one way of committing
any particular tort, Juat as some courts,
for example, still speak occaaionally
of a negligent 'battery.' But for more
than a century, it haa received more or
leas general recognition of an indepen
dent basis of liability
Today
problems and principles, aa well as
distinct queat1ona or policy, arise in
negligence cases." 1�
•

•

•

•

18

Francia H. Bohlen, "The Moral Duty to Aid Others
as a Basia or 'l'ort Liab111ty1.. " University of Pennsylvania
Law 8ev1ew, LVI, ( April, 190�), p. 220.

19

B. Smith Young and William M. Prosser, Torts: Cases
and Materials, Brooklyn, N. Y.: The Foundation Press, 1957,
p. 206.
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In addition to being a separate tort, negligence
may also be a v1olet1on of some statute that requires
or prohibits action and that waa established for the
purpose of protecting individuals or property, as well
as the careless or negligent performance of a contract.20
Thua, a tort may be a crime against the state and one who
is tried in a criminal court may also be sued for damages
in a civil court.

A person may be tried by the state for

manslaughter in the death of another through the negligent
operation of an automobile, but he may also face civil
action tor the tort by the decedent's heirs and be required
to pay damages.
A tort action may also grow out or a breach of contract if any injury occurs, but the breach itself cannot
be a tort.

"An

action as for a tort or an action aa for

a breach of contract may be brought by the same party on
the same state of facts. 1' 21

Only when the defendant fails

to perform a legal duty which results in injury

to the

plaintiff while he fails to fulfill a contract will a
cause of action lie 1n either a tort or contract court.
It is, however, with the civil action for the tort with
which we will be primarily concerned.

20

Walker v. Klopp, 157 N. w. 962 (1916).
21
Louisville and Maahtille R. R. Co. v. 8p1nke, 30
s. B. 968 (1898).
-12-

The criterion necessary for determining negligence
is that of the reasonable man and ordinary care.

The

court attempts to define ordinary care in Hill v. City
ot Glenwood.
There is no precise definition of
ordinary care1 but it may be said
that it 1s such care as an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise under
like circumstances1 and should be pro
portioned to the danger and peril
reasonably to be apprehen�ed from a
lack of proper prudence.2
The standard then is always that care which a reasonable
man would use if he were in a like or similar situation.
But the question now arises of who is

reasonable man

a

and how is this determined.
The Common Law of England (predecessor
of our legal system) has been labori
ously built upon a mythical figure-
the figure of �The Reasonable Man'
He is an ideal1 a standard,
the embodiment of all those qualities
which we demand of the good citizen
The Reasonable Man is always
thinking of others; prudence is his
guide and •safety First'
is his
rule of life
He is one who in
variably looks where he is go1ng1 and
is careful to examine the immediate
foreground � efore he executes a leap
or a bound. j
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

A

•

•

•

•

•

reasonable man is one who exercises a standard of

care dictated by the circumstances in which he is involved.

22100 N. W. 523 (1904).
23
A. P. Herbert1 Misleading Cases 1n the Common Law1
New York: G. P. Putnam1 1930, pp.
12-15.
-13-

Whether or not one has acted as a reasonable man will be
determined by a Judge and a jury in a court of law and
will be dependent upon the elements involved 1n the legal
test of a tortious act.

Thus, negligence constitutes a

question of fact to be decided upon in each case.
Before liability can attach, however, there are three
elements in every tort actio� that must exist in order for
there to be a cause of action.

These are the existence of

a legal duty toward the injured person; a breach or viola
tion of the duty; and damage as the direct and proximate
result of the breach.24

The absence of any of the three

elements of negligence is fatal to a claim.25
Duty requires that a standard of conduct be adopted,
and that this conduct not violate the rights of another.
The existence of a legal duty toward the injured party is
upheld in such cases as Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Company when the court said that ''there is no negligence
unless there is in the particular case a legal duty to
take care, and this duty must be one which is owed to the
plaintiff himself and not merely to others.1126

24

Again in

City of Mobile v. McClure, 127 s. 832 (1930),
25
Howard v. Fowler, 207 s. w. (2d) 559 (1947).
26
162 N. B. 99 (1928).

-14-

Belt v. City or Grand Forks. N. D •• the court ruled that
"'Negligence' being failure to perform a duty. there can
be no negligence. in absence of duty.1127

In other words,

before negligence can be found a relationship mu3t exist
between the injured party and the person committing the
injury, and this relationship must be one 1n which the
commission of a wrong by one becomes the invasion of the
right of the other.

"If the defendant was negligent but

did not have a duty to the plaintiff. defendant's negligence
does not make him liable for judgment for he was under no
duty to the pla1nt1ff. 28
u

e

The decision of whether

01•

not

duty is owed is also a question of law to be decided

upon by the court.
The second element of a tort that must be decided
upon if there is to be a cause of action is whether or
not there exists a breach in the duty that the defendant
owes to the plaintiff.

For a breach to exist# the one

alleged to have committed the wrong must have failed to
conform to the standard of conduct that was required of
him.

To

establish the negligence, the plaintiff must

show that the defendant failed to use the proper care in
performing his duty.
The third element of a tort is present when the 1n
Jury is the direct result of the negligent party's breach
27
68 N. W. (2d) 114 (1955).
28
William L. Prosser, Handbook ot the Law of Torts,
st. Paul, Minn.:
west Publishing Company. 1964, p. 1%16.

-15-

of duty.

It the duty to the plaintiff did in fact exist.

and if a breach or that duty did occur by an act or a
failure to act on the part or the defendant, and it the
inJury incurred by the plaintiff ia a violation of the
plaintiff's rights and the direct result of the defend
ant's negligence, the defendant may indeed

be

It is not autficient that the injury occurred.

liable.
Not only

1nuat the plaint1rr•a rights be violated, but there must
be

a

reaaonably close connection between the wrong occur

ring to the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant.
As stated by the court 1n �it• v. Schnoebelehn "

•

•

•

there must be a negligence and harm and they muat have a
causal connection. "29
The right to recover in a tort action rests on an
additional ractor--that of damage.

"Damage is an essen

tial part or a cause of action tor negligence and muat
be alleged."30

Pl aintiff must have aui'fered an actual

1nJury rather than having merely been placed 1n a poaition to aurrer possible lnJury •1thout actually being
damaged.

"Nominal damagea to vindicate a technical

right cannot

be

recovered in a negligence action where

no losa haa occurred.
realiZed

1e

The threat of future harm not yet

not enough.'' 31

When the possibility or danger

29
18 A. (2d) 186 (1941).
30
wells v. Poland, 198 N. B. 764 (1935).
31
Prosser, op. cit. , PP• 146-47 .
-16-

exists the wronged party may take measures to prevent
the actual danger from occurring in another court, but
he is not entitled to the right of recovery from the
negligent party 1n a tort action.

"Where negligent

conduct threatens irreparable damage to property rights,
a court or equity may act by 1nJunct1on to prevent the
harm before it occurs. "32

Again the court in White v.

Schnoebelehn says, "'l'he posaib111ty that injury may re
sult from an act or omission is sufficient to give the
quality of 'negligence' to the act or omission; but
possibility ia insufficient to impose any liability or
give rise to a cause of action

•

•

•

•

there is no cause

of action unless and until there has been an inJury."33
The main teat of negligence 1a foreseeability.
Could the wrongdoer anticipate that his act or failure
to act might produce harmful results?

"Where a course

of conduct 1a not presc1•1bed by mandate of law, foresee
ability of inJury to one to whom duty 1a owed ia of the
very essence ot negligence, and if injurious consequences
are not foreseen as a result of the conduct, then that
conduct 1a not negligent."34

32

Young and Prosser, op. cit., p. 207.
33
18 A. (2d) 186 (1941).
34
Cleveland v. Danville Traction and Power Co., 18
s. E. (2d) 915 (1�42
•

-17-

There are no rules .f'or negligence and for deter
mining 1f cond uct was proper or negligent except the
criterion of the re asonable man.

If an ordinarily

prudent person would or should have foreseen that his
actions, or his f ailure to act, would le ad to injury
to another, his conduct would be considered negligent.
Should he have foreseen the likelihood of harm as the
result of his act?
might occur?

Was he afraid the d amage or injury

Could he have stopped it?

Did he rea

sonably guard against the expected danger?

"Where 1t

should b e apparent to a reasonable and prudent person
that to pursue a certain course or conduct is likely
to produce results injurious to others, the pursuit of
such a course of conduct is negligence and it is not
necessary that the precise or particular result b e fore
seen. " 35

" If a defendant could not reasonably foresee any

inJury as the result of r11s acts, or if his conduct was
reasonable in the light of what he could anticipate,
there ia no negligence and no 11ab1l1ty."36
When an occurrence is unusual, extraord.4nary, and
improbable, legally there is no liability.

One cannot

be liable for failing to anticipate an improbable danger.
35
McClelland v. Interstate Transit Lines, 6 N. w.
( 2d ) 384 (1942)
36
fil'a v. Hennepin Avenue M. B. Church, 297 N. w .
4
33 (19
•
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Remote possibilities cannot constitute negligence.

"Fail

ure to guard against a remote possibility of accident or
one which could not,

in

the exercise of ordinary care,

be foreseen, does not constitute ' negligence. ,n37
Negligence must be determined in each case.

It is

"a fact which must be proved and will never be presumed,
and proof of the occurrence of an accident does not raise
a presumption of megligence."

The burden of proof al-

ways lies with the plaintiff and his attorney since the
civil action for a tort is always initiated by the in
jured party.

He must show why the injury occurred or

the reason for the accident.

The burden of furnishing proof

of the existence of negligence is on the party who asserts
or alleges it, and the burden of proof does not shift
during the tr1a1. 39

Once the plaintiff has established

the case and presented the essential facts in a negligence
action, the defendant,

j.2

he denies the negligence must

show that he had used proper care.

The decision to deter

mine the responsibility for the alleged negligence is a
function of the Judge and the jury in

a

cou;.·t of law and

will be decided upon by them.

37
Rothstein v. Monetter, 17 N. Y. s. ( 2d ) 369, 372
(1940).
38
Grugan v. Sholl Hotels Finance and Exchange Corp.,
18 A. (2d) 30 (1941).
39
Cofjus Juris Secundum, New York: American Law Book
Company,
V X, p. 460.
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Negligence is a distinct tort for which a civil
action will lie.

It is the failure to meet the standard

of care required of a reasonable and prudent man under
like or similar circumstances.

If one's conduct falls

short of this standard and results 1n injury to another
he is liable in tort to the injured party.

The necessary

elements for a cause of action for negligence include
duty,

breach,

proximate cause and damage.

Foreseeability

is the teat or negligence and the action initiated by the
plaintiff must be decided on in a court of law by a Jury
and a Judge.

-
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CHAPTER III
NEGLIGENCE AND GUIDANCE
Probably the most classic case in the courts of
law involving the tort liability f'or negligence of the
guidance and student personnel worker was that of Bogust
v.

Iverson.40

Here the defendant, a full-time director

of student personnel services and a professor of education, was charged with negligence by the parents of a
deceased student.

The student who was under the direct

guidance and supervision of the defendant wes in need
of professional guidance and committed suicide when the
defendant terminated interviews with her.
negligence alleged

by

'l'he acts of

the parents were the defendant's

failure to offer proper 6Uidance, failure to secure psy
chiatric care for the deceased, and failure to confer
with the parents of the deceased, which prevented them
from acquiring the proper care necessary for their daugh
ter.

The Superior Court of Wisconsin affirmed the deai

sion of the circuit court which ruled

1n

favor of the

counselor defendant.
Three points were brought out in the court' s reason
ing of the case.

First, the court decided that the

40
10 Wisc. (2d) 129, �02
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N. w.

(2d) 228 (1960).

defendant waa not a person qualified as a m•dical doctor
or a specialist in mental disorders, and as such could
not be charged with the same degree or care as a person
trained in medicine or psychiatry.

"To hold that a tea

cher who had had no training, education, or experience
in medical fields is required to recognize 1n a student
a condition, the diagnosis ot which is in a specialized
and technical field would require a duty beyond reaaon."41
Secondly, the complaint stated that the defendant
was negligent in his failure to secure proper medical
care for the deceased and his tailure to notify her par
The court ruled that to hold that the defendant

ents.

was negligent, it must be alleged that the defendant
knew that the deceased would commit suicide.
was no

But there

allegation of faet that the defendant, as a rea

sonably prudent man, could have been aware of such ten
dencies on the part of the deceased.

"The law does not

require anyone 1n the exertlse of reasonable care to take
measures against a danger which a person's mental condition
does not suggest as likely to happen.1142

41

Frederick c . S81bold, W1scons1n Reports: Cases
Determined in the Supreme Court ot Wisconairi. MUrideleln ,
111.: ca11agban and company, 1961, p. 133.
42
Ib1d., p. 139·
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Thirdly, the court stated that the deft111dant had
no obligation to continue interviews with the deceased.
There was no allegation that the interviews benefited
the deceased, that the defendant had a duty to continue
them, or that their termination was the cause of the
student's death or in any way placed her in a worse
situation.

"One who gratuitously renders service to

another, otherwise than by �aking charge of him when
helpless, is not subject to liability for discontinuing
the services if he does not thereby leave the other in
a

worse position than he was 1n when the services were

began."43

Since no duty was found existing in this case

one of the elements of a cause or action in tort for
negligence is not present.
"This case aroused much concern among those engaged
in guidance and counseling and among their fellow members
of the teaching profession.

This concern was expressed in

a brief' am1cus curiae {frit,lld or the court) submitted in
the case by the National Education Association.
The implications of this case for the
future of guidance programs in the schools
and colleges of this country became clearer
with the real1zat1on that, at the present
time, there are approximately 25,000 full or
part-time counselors employed by the schools
and colleges in the fifty states. Any one
of them might have been the defendant in
this case.

43

lbid • ' p • 1 35

•
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To establish a precedent that a couse
of action is stated by the facts plead
ed here would create an occupational
hazard of indeterminate proportions
for each of these individuals and
would, in effect, undermine the effec
tiveness or a part of the public edu
cational program that needs to be
g�atly strengthened at the present
time." 4 4
Bogust v. Iverson is only one case on record, but
there are other circWI18tancea where persons engaged in
the practice of guidance and student personnel work may
find themselves f aced with legal responsibilities and
liabilities for negligence.

Inez Livingston points out

that 11it is not unconunon f or a personnel worker, espe
cially a residence hall advisor, to use his personal car
to take home or to take to the hospital a student who
is ill." 45

Neither is it uncommon for guid ance and

student personnel workers to offer to students rides to
and from meetings, in inclement weather, or to out-of
town conferences in their personal cars.

If an accident

occurs and the student is 1nJured in any of these cases,
the guidance and student personnel worker is responsible
and may be liable in a tort action f or negligence regardless of the circumstance s.
44

Martha L. Ware, Law of Guidance and Counselinf•
Cincinnati, Ohio: w . H. Arideraon company, 1964, p. 63.
45
Inez B. Livingston, " Ia the Personnel Worker
Liable?", Personnel and Guidance Journal, XLIII, (January,
1965) . p. 1J73.
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Guidance and student personnel

worker�

may be called

upon to act in a situation where a student has already
been injured or is already ill.

What is the responsibility

of the guidance or student personnel worker in such a caae?
"If the per�onnel worker administers or prescribes any
treatment he is liable for damages if the treatment should
cause the student to be in a more serious condition than
before the treatment."46

On the other hand there may be

a duty on the part of the guidance or personnel worker to
act in the event of an emergency.

Since negligence con

stitutes an act or an omission, failure to render the
proper first aid in the event that a doctor or other medi
cally trained individual is not immediately available,
may be considered an omission.

Thia may lead to an action

in tort for negligence which might provide the guidance
or student personnel worker with liability if he did not
act as a reasonably prudent person would have acted in a
similar circumstance.

In this case the failure to do some

thing could be alleged to be negligence.

Emergency, how

ever, depends on all the circumstances involved and the
amount of injury incurred.
Other questions of liability for negligence may and
do arise in the life of a guidance and student personnel
worker.

Suppose a student is injured while acting in

46

Ibid. , p. 473.
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accordance with ad vice given by a guidance or student
personnel worker?

What liability would attach if a stu

dent 1s injured in the pursuance of some action which was
given a pproval by the guidance or personnel worker, or 1n
the pursuance of some action requested by the guidance or
personnel worker?

Will negligence be charged if a guid

anc e or personnel worker should have given ad vice but did
not and the student was injured?
SUppose a guidance or personnel worker, or any other
school employee for that matter, fails to keep fac ilitie s
in proper repair when they are placed under his supervision?
What results if a student is inJured 1n a univer•tty- or
college-owned building which has not been sufficiently pro
vided with safety equipment and proper precautionary aid s,
or if guidance and student personnel workers have fa iled
to alert students to an oncoming danger?

Insec ure furnish

ings, unmarked plate glass windows, untac ked carpets and
mats, hazardous walks and stairways, and failure to provid e
necessary information required in case of fires and other
natural disasters can all lead to possible 1nJury which can
and may result in a cause of action for negligence.

Lia

bility might also attach in the absence of proper supervi
sory personnel at college- or university-sponsored prog
rams and activities.
All of the above factors need to be given c onsideration.
None ot the questions can be given a positive or negative

-26-

answer without first applying to them a definite set of
facts.

Then, the standard of care of the reasonable and

prudent man in the same or similar circumstances will
apply as it is determined by the Judge and Jury in the
court.

Must we wait for an occurrence or for some mishap

before allowing our actions proper review and considera
tion and perhaps be confronted with a court case?

Then

it will b e too late to examine the facts and to say that
we were not aware of the possible consequences of our
negligent acts.

Ignorance of the law cannot b e used as

a n excuse.
In a recent case at the University of C1nc1�nati the
father of a minor student named three university officials,
i ncluding student personnel workers, in a damage suit in
connection with the disappearance of his daughter from a
college residence hall.

The alleged charges included the

university's failure to provide protection as to the girl's
health, safety and morals.

We may argue that it is not

the responsibility of the schools and universities to in
sure the health, safety and morals of its student• and that
we are in a n age where the d octrine of in loco parentia is
not being recogniz ed as a function of the schools and un1versi ties, and yet legally

we

are being asked to account

for actions which f a11 to provide circumstances regulating
student conduct which could result in student injuries.

-27-

This will not be an attempt to discuss the theory
of in loco parent1s or to a dvocate its acceptance or
its reversal.

The situation in Cincinnati,

however,

has

left the university and its officials open to a cause
of action for negligence.

How will the courts decide?

Will the alleged facts be shown to be negligence?

Can

the university offic1als meet the test of the reasonable and
prudent man?
sequences?
injury?

Did they neglect a duty which resulted in an

All

the courts,

Should the university have foreseen the con

these questions can only

be decided on by

now that the case has been brought before them.

Whatever the verdict,

the case should make us awere of the

possibility of suit where the actions of the guidance and
student personnel worker are alleged to be negligent.
The Wisconsin courts 1:1 Bogust v.

Iverson in which

the defendant student personnel worker was alleged to be
negligent in a tort action for the death ot the plaintiff's
daughter did not find the defendant liable.

The court

felt that under the circumstances the defendant had no
duty to the pla intiff.

Guidance and student personnel

workers are daily faced with situations that could lead to
a similar cause of action,

and a

case of alleged negligence

is now pending in the Ohio courts.
or not Bogust v.

The question of whether

Iverson has set a precedent for the guid

ance and student personnel worker and whether the Ohio

28
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courts will again rule in !'avor of the defendant remain
to be answered.

We

must wait for the decision of the

courts.

-29-

CHAPTER IV
WHO IS LIABLE?
A number of doctrines under common law, upon which
our present legal system is baaed, granted freedom from
liability tor negligence on the part of both the public
and private schools.

It was the general principle in

common law that the State, as a sovereign, is not liable
in tort for damages for any injuries resulting from the
negligence of its officers, agents, and employee5.

It

is believed that the com.�on law doctrine of state sovereignty provided its immunity to all arms of the state
and had its founding

in

1783 in the Bngl1ah common law

case of Russell v. Men of Devon. 47
often ref'erred to

1n

The principle here is

terms of the �king can do no wrogg"

and was later interpreted and accepted as the "state can
do no wrong11 and carried over into American jurisprudence.
This principle of state sovereignty extending to all
agencies of the state included the sc:.ool districts.
The overwhelmingly recognized general
rule regarding school tort liability
is that the schools are quasi-corpora
tions created as an agency of the
state to execute the purely govern
mental function of providing a free

47
100 Bng. Rep. 359, 2 T. R. 667 (1788 ) .
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and public education for the residents
of the state. As such they are im
bued with the state's immunity from
tort liability in the absence of a
clear statute imposing such 11ab1lity. 48
In Livingston v. Regents of New Mexico College49 the court
prohibited recovery

for damages resulting from tort liabi

lity on the ground of state sovereignty even though the
board of regents carried comprehensive liability insurance.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity for the schools had its
basis in Illinois in the case of Kinnare v. City of Chicago.SO
This doctrine of state sovereignty together with the
doctrine that school districts do not have sufficient money
with which to pay liability claims provided the 1:·as1s for
the school district's immunity from tort liability for negligence.

The reasoning behind the public funds theory was

the belief that school dist�icts are supported by taxes1
and the taxpayers money cannot be used for the purpose of
satisfying legal judg.�ents.

In Thomas v. Broadlands51 the

court of Illinois allowed the doctrine of public funds to
be the decisive factor in its Judgment in favor of the
schools.
48
Robert Stroup# n School Tort Immunity I" North
Dakota Law Review1 XLIII, {Summer, 1967), p. 783.
49
328 P. {2d) 78 (1958).
50
49 N. E. 536 (1898).
51
109 N. B. {2d) 636 (1952).
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There are
ciple of

many who have found fault with the prin

st at e sovere ignty and publ ic funds, however, and

school districts are finding it more and
to

p rotect themselves from

The do ctr ine

state s .

e difficult

legal and fin ancia l re sp ons i

In the past few years the prin-

bil ity i'or negligence .
c1ple of governmental

mor

immun ity

has been reversed in many

as it ex is t ed in co��on law is

now undergoing much st udy in the courts with the tend en cy

Judicial decree as well as legi

toward its abolishmen t .

slat ive s ta tutes are a br o ga t ing the principle of school
district immunity.

" Criticism of the rule ha s not gone

unheeded for the g o ve rnmental immunity doctrine has been
r

e voked in

many states by the

c ourts and

l eg i sl atures . "

52

Illinois was the pacesetter for a bro gatin g the tort immu
nity doctrine with

land Community

its 1 95S decision in Mo l itor v . Kane

Unit School D1str1ct.

followed the precedent

1 96 1 ,

1963

Wis con sin

53

s�t by Illinois .

and Minnesota in

abolished 1?1ununity o f

1962,

Other states soon
"

Mi c higan in

and Arizona

school districts." 54

rt

in
New

York, California and Washington abrogated the immunity
doctrine though constitutional

52

Stroup , op. c it . ,

53
163
54

N. B.

( 2d )

p.

amendment o r appropriate

787.

89 (1959).

Edmund B. Reutter, Jr. , Schools and the Law, Dobbs
Ferry, New York:
Oceana Public ation s , In c . , 1964, p . 109.
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legislat ion . 11 55

" Comprehensive tort liability statutes

now exist in Alaska, California, Hawa ii, Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Utah, and Washington . " 56
School districts are now subject to the same liability
for tort as are private individuals or corporations.
The

same trend toward reversing immunity for tort

liability for negligence took place even earlier 1n the
private school s .

Under the " trust -fund" doctrine chari

table and educational institutions were protected against
char�es of ne�ligence .

It was considered unjust for the

direct beneficiary of a charity to further depJiete the
funds avallable for charitable use by any cl air:i for compensation in

a

tort action .

But it was not always easy

to determine who was a recipient of the charity.

d ent paying full tuition mizht not be con s idered

A stu
a

direct

recipient and could be el igible to recover damages in a
tort action if injured ti:rough the negligence or the
educational institution or one of its a�ents or employees .
" Prior to 1942 onll two or three courts had rejected the
im.'nunity or charities outright . " 57

The case of President

50
Cheater M. Nolte, " Minnesota Joins Growing List of
States Abrogating Historic Immunity Doctrine," American
School Board Jou r nal CXLVII, (December, 1963) , p . 13.
56
,

57

Stroup, op. cit , , p . 790.

Prosser, op. c it . , p . 787.
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and Directors of Gerogetown College v. Hughes58 set a
prec edent by reversing the charitable immunity doctrine.
" By

1955, the courts of only twelve states--Arkansas,

Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ore
gon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming--were still recongizing the doctrine of com
plete

immun

ity for charitiea.0 59

The primary reasons advanced for
abandoning immunity doctrines are
that neither those who organize a
charitable institution nor the
courts have authority to put chari
ties beyond the pale or the law
applicable to all, and that pro
tection of life and limb by orga
nized society i s of gre ater impor
tance to mankind than any species
of charity, and is auperior to
rights of property .oO
Thus, the historic defenses are becoming less and less
available either to private and endowed schools or to
public schools, and the schools are indeed being held
liable for negligenc e in a tort action.
The doctrines of charitable immunity and state sov
ereignty, even when they were at their peak in providing
freedom from tort liab ility

to schools, did not always

protect the individual employe e against liability for
injury sustained by others through his negligence.

Neg

ligence suits were brought directly against the individual
58
130 F. (2d) 810 (1942).
59
Blackwell, op. cit. , p. 151.
60
American Jurisprudence, Rochester, New York :
Cooperative Pub11sh1n g Company, xv, p. 176.
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Lawyers'

involved and these individuals were held liable in tort
for their negligent actions.
Even though some states will still recognize the
principles of sovereign immunity and charitable immunity
as applicable to schools, due care is the personal respons1b111ty of all.

Negligence is not excused and indi

viduals may still be sued and held liable for their
a ctions when they result

1n

inj ury to another.

One of the basic ends of the law of
torts is to place the ultimate lia
bility f or n egligen t inj ury on the
p erson or persons who are primarily
responsible for the inj ury inflicted.
So, as a general rule, every person
who is legally responsible is liable
for his own negligence which is the
proximate cause of any inJury to another,
or of damage to prop erty. Liability
for one's negligence is the rule, and
all concepts of 1mmunit� are really
exceptions to the rule. bl
In Grosso

v.

Witteman6 2 the court stated that a teacher

may be liable for inj ury
to use reasonable care.

to students caused by his failure
Where duty, breach and proximate

cause are alleged to exist, a case can be e stablished
against a teacher, guidance or student personnel worker
or other school employee and the court will determine if
liability will ensue.
61
Co�ua Juris Se cundum, New York :
Company,
v, p. 1034.
62
6 2 N. W. (2d ) 386 (1954).
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American Law Book

The teacher ' s liability i'or damages
resulting from hia negli�ent act
in and about the school rests on the
same principles aa h1a liability as
a private person, removed from the
school. The same standard of care
applies, that of a reasonable and
prudent person acting under like
circumatancea
The aame rule
with respect to actual causation,
foreseeability, and proximate cause
govern the case, and the defenses
available to the teacher are no more
or leas extensive than thoae ava11able to any other defendant. 63
•

•

•

•

The number of teachers and other school employees who have
been sued in recent years 1a on the rise and the amount of
money being awarded for damages resulting from negligence
of school employees in tort actions 1a also increasing.

It haa been established that guidance and student
personnel work are profesaiona and that the guidance and
student personnel worker ia a proteaaional, and that there
is little legal precedence for the profession.

Thus, it

will be neceaaary to show the effect of tort liability
for negligence on other profeaaionala and relate these to
the guidance and student personnel worker.
use the

eame

Will the court

yardstick and the aame standard ot care for

the profeaa1onal as it doea with any other 1nd1v1dual ?
The atandard of care 1• that or the reasonable and
prudent man in like or similar circumatanoes .

63

Thia shows

Paul o. Proehl, " Tort Liability or Teachers,"
Venderb1lt La• .Review, XII ( 1959 ) , P • 723 .
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that the exercise of due care is an individual respon
sibility, but the exerc ise of utmost c are is a professional
respons1b111ty. 64 In Dorris v . warford65 the court says
that one who employs a professional man may exp ect f rom
him the same ordinary

care and skill as one may expect

from any other member of the profession, not as one may
expect from any other individual.
Guidance and student personnel workers including
deans, residenc e hall c ounsel ors, housing officers, acti
vities and athl etic directors are all empl oyees of the
school and are subject to the same l iabil ity for negl igence as others engaged 1n their profession, and must
exercise the same standard or care as do those others in
the same profession.

" Professional p ersonnel are hel d

l egally to a standard commensurate with their professional
training . " 66
The professional is an expert.

Professional respon

sibil ity then requires an expert standard of care.

The

physician, l awyer and acc ountant are c onsidered professionals
and the c ourt requires the expert c are and dil igence
e&erc ised by members of their p rofession.

In Cochran v.

Harrison Memorial Hospital the c ourt held that " before a
64

" School Laws and Teacher Negligence," N.B. A.
search Bull etin, XL, (October, 1962), p. 75 .
65
100 s. w. 312 ( 1907).
66
Reutte r, op. cit. , p. 74.
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Re 

physician or surgeon could be held 1:1.able for malpractice,
he must have done something in the treatment of his patient
which the recognized standard of the medical practice in
h1s c onununity forb ids in s uch cases, or he must have geg
l ected t o do s omething required by that standard.11 67 The
J udge and J ury still dec ide whether the alleged negl igence
exists , b ut often they rauat t urn directly t o the profession
for assist ance in hel ping them to determine what is negli
gent c onduct and whether the defendant exercised due c are.
This is expressed by the court in Adkins v. Ropp.
.
the general rule in malpractice
c ases is that, in det ermining whether
the physician and s urgeon has exercised
the J ury
ordinary skill and c are
must be guided sol ely by the t estimony
of physicians and s urgeons because of
the scient ific nature and character of
the questi ons involved in s uch cases,
and the jury c annot set up steodard8
or skill and care of its own. btl
•

•

•

•

• ,

Again in MacKenzie v. Carman the c ourt says :
The law thus requires a surgeon t o
possess the skill and l earning which
is possessed by the average member
of the medical profession in good
standing, and t o apply that skill
and learning with ordinary re as on
abl e care. He is not l i able for a
mere error of Judgment, provided
he does what he thinks 1a b est af
ter a c areful examination. He does
not guarantee a good result, b ut he
promises by 1mpl1cat1on t o use the
67
254 P . { 2d ) 755 (1953) .
68
14 N . E. (2d ) 727 (1938) .
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skill and learning of the average
physician, to exerc ise reas onable
care, and to exert his best j udg
ment in the er5 ort to bring about
e good re sult .
"i
As to t he sta ndard of c are applied to members of
the legal profession the court in Humboldt Building Asso
c iation Company v. Drucker ' s Executors dec lared that " t he
attorney is liable to his client for the want of such skill,
care,, and diligence as men of the legal profession c onunonly
possess and exercise in like matters of professional emp loy
ment . n 70

And in t he City of Grand Forks

v.

State the c ourt

in discussing the liability of the professional accountant
said , " J>efendanta rep resented themselves as expert accountants, which implied that they were skilled in that class
of work.

In

accepting employment as exp ert acco untants,,

they undertook and the plaint iff had the right to expect,
that in the performance of their duties they would exercise
the average abilit y and skill of those engaged in that
branch of skilled labor . " 71
Having viewed the c ourt's stand on the medical, legal
and accounting professions and their st andard of c are in
ner,11gence c ases, and the court ' s acceptance of guidance
and student p ersonnel work as a profession one can then
69
92 N.Y. Supp. lo63 (1905).
r{O

71

64

s . w.

141 N.

w.

671 {1901).
181 (1913).
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parallel the standard of care required of all professionals
to that of the guidance and student personnel worker .
the guidance or student personnel
negl igent according to the

worker is

If

found to be

standards of his profession

he will undoubtedl :r be judged by the expert standard o f
care required o f

a

reasonable and prudent guidance or stu

dent personnel worker in the same or s imilar c ircumstances .
Any non-compl iance with this standard that results

in neg

l igence and inj ury will bring upon the guidance or person
nel worker a l i abil ity ln tort that could prove to be per
sonally,

financially and professionally embarras s ing .

The doctrines of immunity for state and charitable
institutions and organizations are slowly d isappearing from
the court s ,

and schools and school districts are now l iable

in tort actions for their negligence and for the negligence
In addition to the l iability

of their employees and agen t s .

of' the schools and school districts the exercise of due care
is an individual responsibility for which the
will be liable,

individual

and the stand ard of c are of the reasonable

and prudent man applies to all
of care required of

indiv iduals .

all profe ssionals,

The standard

however,

standard expected of any other individual .

A

exceeds the

profess ional

is an expert who is required to meet the same expert stan
dard of care as are all other members of his profession.
The proper standard of care will

-4 0-

still be determined by a

Judge and jury
to give them

1

but the profession itsel:.' will be a sked

p ro p e r dire c t ion .
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CHAP'l'ER V
PROTBCTIOH AGAINS'l' LIABILITY
'l'o

avoid liability

in

tort for negligence all that

is �quired of a guidance and student personnel worker
is that he exercise the proper care that is required ot
a reasonable and prudent guidance or student personnel
worker.

The

law does not require the guidance or student

personnel worker to guarantee that his actions will not
be the cause of 1nJury bo another; all that he muat do
ia exercise the necessary amount of due care so that
another will not be 1nJured through any fault of hia.
Extraordinary diligence is not necessary against pure
accidents that can and do happen deaptte precautions, and
cl airvoyance regarding foreseeability is not within the
realm of reasonableness.

The applications of basic common

sense and good J udgment are the only necessities to pre
vent occurrences of aituat1ona which might lead to a cause
of action and liability for negl igence .

'l'he

beat way to

protect against suit and liability ia through the exercise
ot ordinary care, the application ot an adequate safety
program personall y and professionally, and the practice
of foresight, not hindsight, with regard to one ' s actions.
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In

the event that the guidance or student personnel

worker does become involved in a tort case for negligence,
some ot the following defenses are available to him.

These

are the aame detenaea that are available to any individual .
and muat be applied to the alleged facts in each circum
stance .

A denial ot negl igence or a statement ot no negl igence
on the part ot the detendant regarding the alleged tacts
can be brought by the guidance or student personnel worker.
The defendant muat show that he was not negl igent , that he
acted aa a reasonable and prudent man, that he used proper
care and that he took all reasonable precautions.

The

detendant • a actions are put to the Jury tor a decision.
The defendant can show that one ot the elements ot a
tort action 1a not presen t .

I t there is no duty, no breach,

or no proximate cause and no damage there cannot be a cause
ot action tor negl igence .
An interveninr, cause may negate a cause or action tor
negligence.

It has been eatabl1ahed that there must be an

unbroken causal connection between the negl igence and the
in�ury or damage auttered.

Any event which breaks the

natural sequence between the detendant ' a action and the
plaintiff ' • 1nJury will be considered an intervening cause .
Whether the intervening cause was responsible for the plain
t1rr • a inJury or whether it was set in motion by the defen
dant ' s negligence will need to be determined by the Jury.
It cannot always be safely assumed that the intervening
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cause ia a reliable criterion tor nonliability. 72
An

act or God could be reaponsible tor the inJ ury

incurred by the plaintiff.
vention in

a

Where there is no human inter

circumstance that leads to 1nJury and where

the 1nJury reeul t• from the direct. immediate and exclu
sive operation or natural torcea completely uncontrolled
by m3n, the detendant may plead that the 1nJury was the
result or . an act or Qod.

When there is no act of negli

gence on ihe part or the defendant and no amount of rore
a 1ght could have prevented the injury the defendant is
innocent et any causality.
No posa1b111t7 or foreseeability on the part ot the
defendant could mean no cause ot action.

An

unavoidable

accident which could not have been prevented. an unusual
occurrence which would probably not have happened. or a
remote poaa1b111ty which would not be due to any l ack or
reasonable care on the part or the defendant cannot be ad
J udged to be negligence.

When one oannot reasonably foresee

the possibility ot 1nJury an action cannot lie tor an in
voluntary accident.

The court demands ordinary care but

it does not require over-protection or extra-caution.

A statute of limitations may expel a cause or action
tor negligence from the courts.

72

The statute of limitations

Gibson v. Garcia, 216 P . (2d ) 119 ( 1950 ) .
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designates the amount of time between the accident or
occurrence causing the inJury and the filing ot the claim
for damages by the plaintiff.

Kach state individually

determines the statute of l imitat ions regarding tort
actions and one would need to conaµlt the l aws ot the
respective state s .
Some states continue t o recogniZe the pr1nc1plea of
sovex-e1gn immunity and charitable immunity which would pro
vide the defense tor an action in tort on the part of the
schools and/or school employees.

These doctrines are fast

disappearing, however, and upheld in only a small percentage
or the courts .

Chapter III discusses the principles ot

sovereign immunity and charitable immunity 1n detail .
Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
may cause him to lose his case in a tort action.

It is

.. such negligence on the part of the plaintiff as to make
the injury the result of the united, mutual, concurring
and contemporaneous negligence ot t!·h1 partie s . " 73

When

one ' s own negl igence contributes to his injury he cannot
recover damages from the defendant .

Bven though the defen

dant waa negl igent in his actions, there is a lack of due
care on the part of the plaintiff whioh constitutes contribu
tory negl igence on the part of the injured plaintiff.

The

contributory negligence, however, muat be shown to be the

-

73

O. F. Shrofer, " Personal Liabilities of Industrial
Arts Inatructora, Industrial Arts and Vocational Education,
LIII, ( November, 1 964), p . 22.
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proximate cause of the injury and either have caused the in
jury or contributed to the negligence of the defendant to cause
the 1nJury.

74

Comparative negligence might be said to be an exten
s ion of the doctrine of contributory negligence, but it
is not as widely acceptable and is available only in
those states having specific statutes recognizing i t .
Comparative negligence exists when both parties have mu
tually contributed to the injury and instead or the pla1n
t 1ff being unable to recover damages from the defendan t ,
both parties are apportioned for the damage s .

Damages

are pro-rated on the amount or negligence attributed by
each party on the basis of degrees of guilt . 75

The courts

in the states recognizing contributory negligence feel
that it is fairer to divide the damages between all the
negligent parties, rather than having the plaintiff accept
full responsibility and lose his claim.
The doctrine of assumption or risk holds the belief
that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed an obvious risk
which was inherent in the type of activity in which he parti
cipated.

This kind or situat ion often occurs in the areas

of athletics or sports-related activities .

When the

student knows that there is a possibil ity of an injury

74

Willis v .
75
Grosso v .

Schlagenhauf, 188 A . 702 ( 1936 ) .
Witteman, 62 N.
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w.

( 2d ) 386 ( 1954 ) .

occurring he 1a assumed to have realized the danger or
riak and he knowingly and willingl7 enters into the acti
vity.

" Th• doctrine rests on two premises:

First, that

the nature and extent of the risk are fully appreciated; and
second, that it is volunearilJ incurred." 76

There ia no

l1abil 1t1 where the risk is normal, but the burden ot proving
asawapt1on of risk 11ea with the detendant.

The court 1n

H\µln v. Windaor Hotel also distinguished between the assump
tion or risk doctrine and that ot contributorJ' negligence.
A The doc�r1nea of contributory negligence and assumption
or risk

not identical

are

•

•

•

•

The essence of contributory

negligence is carelessness; of aaaumpt1on of risk, ventur
ousneaa. " 77
Any case in tort involving negligence must go for
its ultimate decision before a court of law and be decided
upon by a Judge and a Jury.
in

own action•

Every person is liable tor his

the event or negligence and personal legal

liabil ity does exist for all cases or proven negligence.
Negligence and liability for it should be the concern ot
all guidance and student personnel workers.

It adJudged

negligent by the court in a tort action, the guidance and
student personnel worker, or any other individual , races
liability for damages attributed to his negligence.

Liabi

l ity for negligence results 1n a definite f inancial loss,

76
Hunn v. Windsor Hotel , 193
7
7
Ibid , p 57.
•

•
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s. B.

57 (1937 ) .

and the guidance or student personnel worker must satisfy
the•• Judgments and autter this loss himself.

He

can pro

tect himaelt from this burden, through l iability insurance.
Group or individual 1naurance ia available 1n ma� states
to protect school employees trom the tinancial harshness
that could be incurred from an action in tort for negli
gence.

It must be stated that l iabil ity insurance does

not attect the question ot liability, but merely provides
for the payment or Judgments.

The insurance does not constd

tute a waiver or a tort action and cannot be used aa a defense
for negligence . 78
Liability tor negligence can be avoided by the guid
ance and student personnel worker by exercising due care
and applying the standard of the reasonable man to all
actions.

It a cause or action should arise, certain defenses

are available to all defendants 1n a negl igence suit and
these can be drawn upon by the guidance and student per
sonnel worker.

These include a denial of negligence, a

missing element in a 1'ort action, an intervening cause,
an act of God, the absence or foreseeability, a statute
or l imitations, the doctrines or sovereign immunity and
charitable immunity, contributory negligence, comparative
negligence, and the assumption or riak.

78
Supler

v.

Liability is

School District, 182 A {2d) 536 (1962 ) .
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determined by a Judge and Jury and if round liable,

the

defendant must satisfy the Judgment from his own resources
unless he has l iabil ity insurance .

This insurance is

available in moat states to all guidance and student
personnel workers on an individual or group basis.
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CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Thia paper has been an attempt t o acquaint peraona
•ho are engaged in the proteas1ons ot guidance and student
personnel •ork •1th the la• of tort and l 1ab111t7 tor neg
l igence in order that they may have a better understanding
of the poaa ible results of their negligent actions on both
a personal and a proteaaional level.

The status ot the

guidance and student personnel •orker as a prote a a ional
has been establ ished and the history ot tort l iability for
negligence haa been revietfed .

Negl igence being the fail

ure to act ae a reasonable and prudent man 1n a like or
a 1m1lar circumstance provides one with a duty to exercise
due care in all actions which could result
others .

1n

an injury to

An individual who does not use prudence and take

proper care 1a l iable for all injuries to others which are
incurred aa a result of his negligence .
Anyone 1a 1n a posit ion to incur liabilit7.

Liab111t7

of all kinda baa been increasing over the 7eara, and al
though the guidance and student personnel worker baa been
involved

1n

a relatively fe• number ot caaea to date, this

does not insure him of freedom trom 1 1ab111t7.
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At one

time the guidance and student personnel worker might
have come under the protection or the schools and school
districts and might not have been subject to l iability
1n tort tor negligence by virtue or the sovere ign immunity

and charitable immunity doctrines, but the courts now feel
that these doctrines are unfounded and that every person
is liable in tort for his own negligence .

The profesaional

person in addition to exercising the ordinary standard of
care of the reasonable and prudent man, must also meet the
standard ot care of the reasonable and prudent prote�aional,
and the profession itself must direct what that standard
will be .

Thus , the guidance and student personnel profes

s ions should set up the standard of the reasonable and
prudent guidance and personnel worker.

To

an extent this

has been approached by the American Personnel and Guidance
Aaaoc1at1on in its Code of Ethics .
A

number of defenses are available to a guidance and

student personnel worker if he becomes involved in a to�t
The circumstances surrounding each

aet 1on tor negligence.

case will lead to 1ta determination of l iability.

The

alleged tacts of each cause of action must meet all the
necessary elements or

a

tort action as well as the teat or

toreaeeab111ty1 and theae facts must be brought before the
court to be judged.

It a court action ar1aea tor an individ

ual, be he guidance or student personnel worker or ordinary
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citizen, it can have serious repercusa1ons even though
liability does not attach.

Involvement 1n a court case

can be costly in time, money and position whether or not
the Judge and Jury have ruled in favor of the guidance or
student personnel worker a.nd adjudged him liable or free
from liability.
The f 1nanc1al burden can be a heavy one &t one enters
into a court case.

One undergoes considerable expense in

attorney ' s fees, costs for investigating the case, court
costs, depositions and witness expenses without even con
sidering the possibility of being adjudged liable.

A

lia

bility ruling will also bring all the additional expenses
of a retrial if an appeals case is initiated.

It might be

wise, financially, to obtain l iability insurance, but it is
necessary to keep 1n mind that this insurance covers only
the legal Judgment.

It does not always meet the other ex

penses of a cause of action and 1t will never excuse liabi-

1 ity.
Timewise, almost as much is expended as 1a involved
financially.

Time for meeting with l awyers, time tor

collecting evidence, and time in court1 to say moth1ng of
the time spent waiting for the actual trial to come before
the courts provides the guidance or student personnel worker
with an additional burden to his already busy schedules.
The loaa or time and money is only a minor considera
tion when one looks at the possible damage to the personal

-
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and professional reputation of the guidance
personnel worker who become8 involved in

a

or student
tort action

An individual guidance or student per

for negligence.

sonnel worker can dis credit himself' and his s chool .

Re

gardless of the court ' s dacis ion the tact that he was

in

any way involved in a cause of action for negl igence may

forever remain in the minds ot others and be r1amag1ng to
him a s an individua l ,

a s a school employee,

and a e a mem

ber o f the guidance or student personnel profession.
Since the profess ion has l ittle or no basis for tort
liabil ity and almost no history of case

law,

attorneys

special izing in the defense of guidance and student per
sonnel workers

involved in l iability ror negl igence are

practically nonexistent .

The ques t ion is how adequately

will one be able to find a defense
arise s .

if a cause of act ion

As the profession continues to grow,

legal problems cont inue to

increase ,

so will the

and the nurnber of

opportun ities for causes or s c t ion in tort for negl iger,�e

''.>J .�11

follow this

that the guidance

sarne trend .

Thie

should not me an ,

however ,

and student personnel worker need operate

under the constant fear that a possibility of a court case
for negligence will arise.
use prudence

His best defense will be

in all his activitie s ,

professional day,

and to be

not only during the

informed about the

and the actions or the court s .
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to

law of tort

Although there are meny demands
guidance and

on the t ime of the

student per13onnel worker one needs to become

acquainted with the ent ire area or legal
consequences of the profe s s ion .

1mpl1ce.t 1ons and

In order to do this,

more

unity is needed among the profession to educate all its
members regarding the l e g2 l problems of the profe ss ion and
to 1n:tt1ate concern oveP the poss1b111t1es of court actions .
To accomplish these objectives,

it will be necessatttJ to

analyze the constitutions and laws of the states regarding
school s ,

to become familiar with judicial de c i s ion s �f

fect1ng the guidance and student personnel worke r ,

to re

view the rules and regulations end the policies of the
schools toward the prevention of poss ible causes of action,
to attempt to legalize any and all defenses should a cause
of act ion arise,

and to influence the courts and legisla

tures toward understanding the guidance and

nel profe ssions.

There

student person

is no ev iden ce that the c�urts

and legislatures have outwardly denied acceptance of t�e
;:;uidance

end �tudent personnel worker as a professional

nor have they prohibited the legal prote c t ion required by
the profess ion,

but it does seem necess ary that

organize thems elves to insure their status.

-
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